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past three years have seen a very deep interest to reform the special services (General Directorate for External Security, DGSE) and those of intelligence, marked notably by the creation of a National Intelligence Council and a National Coordinator intelligence. And especially by the merger of the Directorate for Territorial Surveillance (DST) and GR under the name Central Directorate of Internal Intelligence (DCRI). Interested in political circles, it was largely welcomed the additional efficiency gains and "productivity" that these changes.
What conclusions to draw: a line from France in blind Tunisia and Egypt, eight hostages scattered somewhere between the Middle East and Africa, four hostages died in three attempts at recovery in Somalia, Mauritania and Niger. A balance must therefore be constructed execrable to the torque load special services and intelligence services, political power, and a question must be asked: Is this tool or is it his purpose is at stake?
nearly twenty years ago, in a memorandum in January 1992, the DGSE wrote: "Our country should explore with lucidity the arrival of the FIS in control of the country. And today, do everything not to "demonize" the Islamic power that will fall into place, consider the signs that agree to show his willingness to work closely with Algeria whatever the democratic choice of his people. " Doubtless this advice was not followed, but at least the arbitration policy was made the he was at the time with a clear vision made possible by an accurate prediction of future events.
In Tunisia, "we did not see it coming," repeats at every political power. Parliament is likely, as he comes back, ask some questions about the blindness of the executive. In preparing some for him. What was in the six months preceding the events, analysis of the situation in Tunisia and the DGSE DCRI? How the coordinator and the Council have they paid, if any, to the knowledge of political power and forbidden to him? How the Sahel, Permanent red zone of the DGSE, he was left, it seems, unclaimed by the DGSE? How and by whom decisions were taken hostage release and its procedure ? Therefore, both Somalia and Mauritania and Niger, is a unit of the French army, wrongly called "special force", not the special forces of the DGSE, which were implemented?
Never in recent decades, a negative balance could also be trained to respect the policy area of special services and intelligence. Here as elsewhere, the reform for reform and no other aim.
Claude Silberzahn
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